I received my PhD in Philosophy from Princeton in 2014.
I'm currently an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Western Michigan University. My research falls within three main areas: the philosophy of mind, social and political philosophy, and the philosophy of language.
I'm currently working on a book of philosophical essays on grief. You can find me (virtually) at Texas Tech on September 10th, where I'll be talking about the kind of grief that leads us to search for the dead, and (in person) at the Amphitheater at Friedmann Hall on WMU's campus on October 11, 4-5:30, where I'll be talking about our empathy for the dead. In the spring, I'll be joining Kathleen Higgins and Ryan Preston-Roedder at the Pacific APA for a book symposium on Michael Cholbi's Grief: A Philosophical Guide.
You can join me here for a podcast conversation about race and the politics of loss, the main theme of my 2019 lecture for The Center for the Study of Ethics in Society.
I'm currently an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Western Michigan University. My research falls within three main areas: the philosophy of mind, social and political philosophy, and the philosophy of language.
I'm currently working on a book of philosophical essays on grief. You can find me (virtually) at Texas Tech on September 10th, where I'll be talking about the kind of grief that leads us to search for the dead, and (in person) at the Amphitheater at Friedmann Hall on WMU's campus on October 11, 4-5:30, where I'll be talking about our empathy for the dead. In the spring, I'll be joining Kathleen Higgins and Ryan Preston-Roedder at the Pacific APA for a book symposium on Michael Cholbi's Grief: A Philosophical Guide.
You can join me here for a podcast conversation about race and the politics of loss, the main theme of my 2019 lecture for The Center for the Study of Ethics in Society.
Selected Papers
On Grief's Wandering Thought: A Philosophical Exploration (forthcoming in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly)
This paper challenges an orthodoxy in recent philosophical discussions of grief, namely, that grief is essentially tied to the thought that a person of significance to oneself has died. As first-person reports make clear, one can find oneself cut off from the significant other not simply in body but also in thought. This is not, moreover, an isolated difficulty, but one that may have repercussions for one's capacity to form an outlook on the social world, the natural world, and the world viewed from one's own scheme of ends. Taking C. S. Lewis's diary of grief as a guide, I argue that our capacity to think of our significant others depends, surprisingly enough, on our capacity to acknowledge their independence from us even in death.
This paper challenges an orthodoxy in recent philosophical discussions of grief, namely, that grief is essentially tied to the thought that a person of significance to oneself has died. As first-person reports make clear, one can find oneself cut off from the significant other not simply in body but also in thought. This is not, moreover, an isolated difficulty, but one that may have repercussions for one's capacity to form an outlook on the social world, the natural world, and the world viewed from one's own scheme of ends. Taking C. S. Lewis's diary of grief as a guide, I argue that our capacity to think of our significant others depends, surprisingly enough, on our capacity to acknowledge their independence from us even in death.
On Grief's Sweet Sorrow (forthcoming in European Journal of Philosophy)
This paper draws attention to a neglected aspect of grief: its "sweet" sorrow. This sorrow presents us with a formidable challenge, namely, to explain how what is bitter---the misery of loss---can be found to be sweet. Those drawn into this sorrow suspect that it is somehow too sweet. Are their suspicions well founded? Why is it and it alone sweet to those who delight in it and why is it not just sweet but companion-like and even dear? Guided by the observations of St. Augustine and C. S. Lewis, I propose that this sorrow is a form of self-pity that displaces the significant other from the center of one's concern and affords an enhanced intimacy with oneself. The proposal vindicates the impression that one finds in this sorrow a companion that can take the place of the significant other and also positions us to address one of the most fundamental questions that might be raised in connection with grief, namely whether the one who has died is a proper object of concern or whether our grief is ultimately for ourselves, for a loss that is ours and ours alone.
This paper draws attention to a neglected aspect of grief: its "sweet" sorrow. This sorrow presents us with a formidable challenge, namely, to explain how what is bitter---the misery of loss---can be found to be sweet. Those drawn into this sorrow suspect that it is somehow too sweet. Are their suspicions well founded? Why is it and it alone sweet to those who delight in it and why is it not just sweet but companion-like and even dear? Guided by the observations of St. Augustine and C. S. Lewis, I propose that this sorrow is a form of self-pity that displaces the significant other from the center of one's concern and affords an enhanced intimacy with oneself. The proposal vindicates the impression that one finds in this sorrow a companion that can take the place of the significant other and also positions us to address one of the most fundamental questions that might be raised in connection with grief, namely whether the one who has died is a proper object of concern or whether our grief is ultimately for ourselves, for a loss that is ours and ours alone.
Race and the Politics of Loss: Revisiting the Legacy of Emmett Till (forthcoming in Ergo)
This paper explores the idea that mourning can help us to bear not only personal but also political losses. It focuses, in particular, on the proposal that legacies of racial loss and violence should be collectively mourned. I argue that Mamie Till Mobley was developing such a proposal in 1955, the year her son Emmett Till was lynched and in which she brought his body before all Americans, calling on them to look at it so that they might, together, say what they had seen. Mobley's proposal challenges what I take to be the leading rival position on the relationship of grief to political life, namely, that it is, at best, a catalyst for the achievement of political ends. But as I argue, Mobley's proposal also raises challenges for present-day efforts to articulate a politics of loss, which are quick to assume either that such losses cannot be mourned collectively or that they have always been ours to mourn together. I will argue that these efforts have failed to take into account the insight behind Mobley's invitation. My aim, in clarifying its significance, is to expand philosophical inquiry into the relationship between the emotions and political life and, more specifically, to contribute to an evaluation of the prospects for a mournful politics.
This paper explores the idea that mourning can help us to bear not only personal but also political losses. It focuses, in particular, on the proposal that legacies of racial loss and violence should be collectively mourned. I argue that Mamie Till Mobley was developing such a proposal in 1955, the year her son Emmett Till was lynched and in which she brought his body before all Americans, calling on them to look at it so that they might, together, say what they had seen. Mobley's proposal challenges what I take to be the leading rival position on the relationship of grief to political life, namely, that it is, at best, a catalyst for the achievement of political ends. But as I argue, Mobley's proposal also raises challenges for present-day efforts to articulate a politics of loss, which are quick to assume either that such losses cannot be mourned collectively or that they have always been ours to mourn together. I will argue that these efforts have failed to take into account the insight behind Mobley's invitation. My aim, in clarifying its significance, is to expand philosophical inquiry into the relationship between the emotions and political life and, more specifically, to contribute to an evaluation of the prospects for a mournful politics.
Black Lives Matter or All Lives Matter? Color-blindness and Epistemic Injustice (Social Epistemology, 2018)
Those who take 'All lives matter' to oppose 'Black lives matter' take the latter to mean something like 'Only black lives matter.' Those who regard this exclusionary construal as mistaken hold the error to be due to an ideology of color-blindness. It has further been argued that the ideologically-motivated suppression of racial discourse has resulted in an epistemic injustice, blinding objectors to the fact that 'Black lives matter' really means 'Black lives matter, too.' I will argue that attempts to make sense of this interpretive response in terms of color-blindness are mistaken. As I will discuss, the interpretive debates surrounding the words 'Black lives matter’ are reminiscent of those surrounding 'Black Power,' which unfolded long before color-blindness could be said to have been a prevailing ethos. Critical affirmations such as 'Black Power' and 'Black lives matter' have proved difficult for many interpreters to understand because of the way that they manifest resistance to white supremacy, eschewing both racial exclusion and racial inclusion (the latter fact being masked by inclusive reconstructions such as 'Black lives matter, too'). As I argue, however, the critical function of these statements calls into question the applicability of standard accounts of epistemic injustice.
Those who take 'All lives matter' to oppose 'Black lives matter' take the latter to mean something like 'Only black lives matter.' Those who regard this exclusionary construal as mistaken hold the error to be due to an ideology of color-blindness. It has further been argued that the ideologically-motivated suppression of racial discourse has resulted in an epistemic injustice, blinding objectors to the fact that 'Black lives matter' really means 'Black lives matter, too.' I will argue that attempts to make sense of this interpretive response in terms of color-blindness are mistaken. As I will discuss, the interpretive debates surrounding the words 'Black lives matter’ are reminiscent of those surrounding 'Black Power,' which unfolded long before color-blindness could be said to have been a prevailing ethos. Critical affirmations such as 'Black Power' and 'Black lives matter' have proved difficult for many interpreters to understand because of the way that they manifest resistance to white supremacy, eschewing both racial exclusion and racial inclusion (the latter fact being masked by inclusive reconstructions such as 'Black lives matter, too'). As I argue, however, the critical function of these statements calls into question the applicability of standard accounts of epistemic injustice.
How to Cross the Atlantic Without Crossing It
This paper focuses on a decades-long debate concerning the modal status of the progressive and defends the thesis that the debate, though in a certain sense localized, actually gives us reason to abandon an approach to explanation within linguistics and philosophy that is currently in ascendancy; it presents us with a crack in the foundation. In particular, I argue that while some progressives give rise to substantive modal interpretations—namely, those that pattern with 'Mary is crossing the Atlantic,' which is associated with an arrival across—others do not—namely, those that pattern with 'Mary is swimming,' which isn’t associated with an outcome. Once these patterns are in view, the principal difficulty in accounting for them is immediately apparent: if we assume that progressive contributes a substantive modal condition, we fail to account for half of the pattern and if we assume that it doesn't, we fail to account for the other half. Since both parties to this debate assume that systematically available modal interpretations are to be explained in terms of modal meanings and their absence in terms of the absence of modal meanings, neither is in a position to account for these interpretations, explaining, in my view, the tendency to treat all progressives on the model of either 'crossing'- or 'swimming'-progressives. But though this approach to explanation is entrenched, it isn't the only one. This paper is an attempt to motivate an alternative and, specifically, to conceptualize the relationship between interpretation and form in a way that makes space for the possibility that these modal interpretations are not to be explained in terms of modal meanings.
This paper focuses on a decades-long debate concerning the modal status of the progressive and defends the thesis that the debate, though in a certain sense localized, actually gives us reason to abandon an approach to explanation within linguistics and philosophy that is currently in ascendancy; it presents us with a crack in the foundation. In particular, I argue that while some progressives give rise to substantive modal interpretations—namely, those that pattern with 'Mary is crossing the Atlantic,' which is associated with an arrival across—others do not—namely, those that pattern with 'Mary is swimming,' which isn’t associated with an outcome. Once these patterns are in view, the principal difficulty in accounting for them is immediately apparent: if we assume that progressive contributes a substantive modal condition, we fail to account for half of the pattern and if we assume that it doesn't, we fail to account for the other half. Since both parties to this debate assume that systematically available modal interpretations are to be explained in terms of modal meanings and their absence in terms of the absence of modal meanings, neither is in a position to account for these interpretations, explaining, in my view, the tendency to treat all progressives on the model of either 'crossing'- or 'swimming'-progressives. But though this approach to explanation is entrenched, it isn't the only one. This paper is an attempt to motivate an alternative and, specifically, to conceptualize the relationship between interpretation and form in a way that makes space for the possibility that these modal interpretations are not to be explained in terms of modal meanings.
Stative Puzzles: A Case Against Hidden Modality
This paper focuses on a set of modal puzzles that challenge deeply entrenched assumptions about how we come to interpret and understand natural languages. These puzzles arise in connection with sentences like 'Mary is in Paris for a week,' among others, which appear not to bear any obvious modal meanings (neither 'is in Paris' nor 'for a week' presents a strong case). These sorts of sentences are puzzling, in part, because they unexpectedly give rise to modal interpretations (e.g., it is understood that Mary stays in Paris until the end of the week across projected possible circumstances) which they then, equally unexpectedly, appear to lose ('Mary was in Paris for a week' says only that she actually spent a week there). Though the practice of explaining such modal interpretations in terms of modal meanings has become reflexive, I argue that these sorts of sentences cannot be assumed to have modal meanings; the assumption that they do is, in fact, what generates and sustains these apparent puzzles. Instead, these modal interpretations call for an "interface explanation"—one that appeals to an interaction between linguistic and extra-linguistic cognition—and, in particular, one that explains these modal interpretations in terms of an interaction between non-modal language and modal cognition. As I discuss, this conclusion ramifies across a constellation of modal interpretations that are thought to comprise a major natural language modal system (the "imperfective" system). If am right, this system is not a modal system at all, suggesting that linguistic meaning plays a much more circumscribed role in our ability to understand language than is currently assumed.
This paper focuses on a set of modal puzzles that challenge deeply entrenched assumptions about how we come to interpret and understand natural languages. These puzzles arise in connection with sentences like 'Mary is in Paris for a week,' among others, which appear not to bear any obvious modal meanings (neither 'is in Paris' nor 'for a week' presents a strong case). These sorts of sentences are puzzling, in part, because they unexpectedly give rise to modal interpretations (e.g., it is understood that Mary stays in Paris until the end of the week across projected possible circumstances) which they then, equally unexpectedly, appear to lose ('Mary was in Paris for a week' says only that she actually spent a week there). Though the practice of explaining such modal interpretations in terms of modal meanings has become reflexive, I argue that these sorts of sentences cannot be assumed to have modal meanings; the assumption that they do is, in fact, what generates and sustains these apparent puzzles. Instead, these modal interpretations call for an "interface explanation"—one that appeals to an interaction between linguistic and extra-linguistic cognition—and, in particular, one that explains these modal interpretations in terms of an interaction between non-modal language and modal cognition. As I discuss, this conclusion ramifies across a constellation of modal interpretations that are thought to comprise a major natural language modal system (the "imperfective" system). If am right, this system is not a modal system at all, suggesting that linguistic meaning plays a much more circumscribed role in our ability to understand language than is currently assumed.
