I'm currently an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Western Michigan University. I received my PhD from Princeton in the fall of 2014, under the supervision of Delia Graff Fara and Gideon Rosen.
Most of my current research focuses on questions at the foundation of the study of meaning and is primarily concerned with the question of how semantic explanation is related to linguistically-encoded meaning and of how linguistically-encoded meanings interact or interface with extra-linguistic cognition (which is really a contemporary articulation of the question 'How is language connected to thought?'). The central finding of this research is that there are a variety of natural language expressions that systematically give rise to modal interpretations though they do not have linguistically-encoded modal meanings. What these interpretations reflect is the modal structure of cognition, not the modal structure of language. A semantic explanation of these expressions, then, encompasses not only an explanation of their meanings but an explanation of how these meanings engage modal cognition and what the semantic output of that system is once it is so engaged. I propose that these modal interpretations be understood against a broad framework within which natural language enables the domain-general use of representations that might otherwise remain isolated with domain-specific cognitive systems. What these modal interpretations ultimately reflect, then, is the (domain-general) use of non-modal expressions within the modal domain of thought.
Most of my current research focuses on questions at the foundation of the study of meaning and is primarily concerned with the question of how semantic explanation is related to linguistically-encoded meaning and of how linguistically-encoded meanings interact or interface with extra-linguistic cognition (which is really a contemporary articulation of the question 'How is language connected to thought?'). The central finding of this research is that there are a variety of natural language expressions that systematically give rise to modal interpretations though they do not have linguistically-encoded modal meanings. What these interpretations reflect is the modal structure of cognition, not the modal structure of language. A semantic explanation of these expressions, then, encompasses not only an explanation of their meanings but an explanation of how these meanings engage modal cognition and what the semantic output of that system is once it is so engaged. I propose that these modal interpretations be understood against a broad framework within which natural language enables the domain-general use of representations that might otherwise remain isolated with domain-specific cognitive systems. What these modal interpretations ultimately reflect, then, is the (domain-general) use of non-modal expressions within the modal domain of thought.
Papers
Papers-in-Progress
Back to the Futurate
I propose a novel analysis of simple futurates (e.g., 'The Yankees play the Red Sox tomorrow'). This analysis represents a synthesis of my proposals concerning the linguistic and cognitive profiles of progressive and futurate progressive expressions (in 'The Limits of Linguistic Meaning' and 'Modality Without Modals,' respectively) as well as my work on the puzzling modal behavior of a variety of other stative expressions (in 'Stative Puzzles: A Case Against Hidden Modality'). I also discuss how this analysis might open the way toward an interesting reconceptualization of what is now regarded as a major modal system in natural language: the imperfective system. Making Progress I review some ontological puzzles that concern the status of objects implicated in temporally extended, and in-progress events. I argue that my semantic analyses of the relevant sorts of event descriptions resolve these puzzles. I also consider leading alternatives to my account and show how these alternatives yield only piecemeal insights into these very puzzling but systematically connected phenomena. Modality as a Window into Cognition I summarize the case for my claim that a variety of natural language expressions give rise to modal interpretations though they do not have modal meanings. I also address questions concerning the intelligibility of the sort of explanation that I claim they require, among them, “Why should the interpretations to which they give rise be expected?” and “Where else might we find similar interpretations?” The answers to these questions reveal a great deal about the limitations of dominant frameworks for thinking about meaning and interpretation in both linguistics and philosophy as well as something about how they need to be revised. |
Upcoming and Recent Presentations
August 2018 Meaning Workshop (Iceland): TBD
April 2018 Workshop on the Semantics and Metaphysics of Aspect: TBD Feb 16, 2018 Osher Lifetime Learning Institute: The Aesthetics of Exposure and the Spectacle of Black Death Oct 13, 2017 MAP Social and Political Workshop: Black lives matter or All lives matter? Color-blindness and Epistemic Injustice July 24-28, 2017 The Nova Scotia Meaning Workshop: TBA May 28-31, 2017 Canadian Philosophical Association: Minimalist Interface Explanations May 12-14, 2017 PhiLang 2017 (Lodz): Minimalist Interface Explanations May 5-6, 2017 Workshop on States (Northwestern): Back to the Futurate April 5, 2017 Public Lecture (Lyceum Lecture Series): Black Lives Matter or All Lives Matter? Color-blindness and Interpretive Injustice Feb. 14, 2017 Guest Lecture (WMU, Women and Gender Studies): Black Lives Matter or All Lives Matter? Color-blindness and Hermeneutic Injustice July 22-23, 2016 Philosophy of Language Workshop (MIT): Stative Puzzles: A Case Against Hidden Modality April 9-10, 2016 Workshop on Aspect and Modality (WMU/Hampshire College): Stative Puzzles: A Case Against Hidden Modality March 19, 2016 Guest Lecture (WMU): The Word 'I' in the Mouth of the Man Who Says It Dec. 2, 2015 PhLing Group (Northwestern): Stative Puzzles: A Case Against Hidden Modality Nov. 20, 2015 Colloquium Talk (WMU): Stative Puzzles: A Case Against Hidden Modality June 14-16, 2015 Mentoring Workshop for Early Career Women (UMass): Stative Puzzles: A Case Against Hidden Modality June 2, 2015 Canadian Philosophical Association (Ottawa): Modality as a Window into Cognition May 31, 2015 Canadian Philosophical Association (Ottawa): Comments on Rob Stainton's 'Asserting vs. Merely Communicating' May 20, 2015 Postdoctoral Research Day (SFU): Modality as a Window into Cognition May 14-16, 2015 The Fourth International Conference on Philosophy of Language and Linguistics (University of Lodz, Poland): Modality as a Window into Cognition | ||||||||||||
