I'm an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Western Michigan University. I received my PhD in Philosophy from Princeton in 2014.
My research falls within three main areas: the philosophy of mind, social and political philosophy, and the philosophy of language. I'm currently developing papers on compassion, empathy, and the (supposed) futility of grief. In the first case, I'm thinking about the connection between compassion and goodness, about whether compassion can be had for groups rather than individuals, and relatedly, about whether it can be invoked in political settings. In connection with empathy, I'm thinking about so-called 'perspective-shifting' (how it often comes to nothing more than holding back the force of one's own judgments) and the relationship and tension between two familiar lines of thought, the first being that empathy requires my taking the stance that I could be you (in your position) and the second being that empathy requires that I put myself in your position. In the last case, I'm working on a follow-up to 'Grief's Wandering Thought' in which I explore the idea that grief wants the impossible: that the dead not be dead.
I gave a public lecture in October on the topic of race and the politics of loss. You can listen to the podcast episode here in which I discuss some of the main themes of my lecture with The Center for the Study of Ethics in Society. I also hosted a workshop on grief and politics as part of the fifth annual meeting of the Public Philosophy Network (hosted by Michigan State University).
My research falls within three main areas: the philosophy of mind, social and political philosophy, and the philosophy of language. I'm currently developing papers on compassion, empathy, and the (supposed) futility of grief. In the first case, I'm thinking about the connection between compassion and goodness, about whether compassion can be had for groups rather than individuals, and relatedly, about whether it can be invoked in political settings. In connection with empathy, I'm thinking about so-called 'perspective-shifting' (how it often comes to nothing more than holding back the force of one's own judgments) and the relationship and tension between two familiar lines of thought, the first being that empathy requires my taking the stance that I could be you (in your position) and the second being that empathy requires that I put myself in your position. In the last case, I'm working on a follow-up to 'Grief's Wandering Thought' in which I explore the idea that grief wants the impossible: that the dead not be dead.
I gave a public lecture in October on the topic of race and the politics of loss. You can listen to the podcast episode here in which I discuss some of the main themes of my lecture with The Center for the Study of Ethics in Society. I also hosted a workshop on grief and politics as part of the fifth annual meeting of the Public Philosophy Network (hosted by Michigan State University).
Selected Papers
Grief's Wandering Thought: A Philosophical Exploration
In this paper, I argue that grief is not just another emotional outlook. Rather, grief is, as Freud said, "a grave departure from the normal attitude to life." When profound, grief can shake even one’s capacity to think of the lost loved one so that it would be a mistake to treat grief, essentially, as a form of thought of another—an orthodoxy in the recent philosophical literature on grief that prevents us from attending to grief in its full complexity. I argue that what can look like thought, even highly reflective thought, may in fact be better understood as a form of withdrawal (from the social world, into the self, etc.). What can appear, for example, to be a reflective or intellectually distanced stance on one’s own grief may be better understood as a detached one—a stance so removed from normal forms of engagement that one cannot enter into reflection in any recognizable sense. Taking C. S. Lewis's diary of grief as a guide, I argue that our capacity to think of the one who has died and to properly grieve them may, surprisingly enough, depend on one’s capacity to recognize their independence from oneself and to continue one’s relationship with them past death. In short, one must restore what has been lost so that there can, in fact, be loss.
In this paper, I argue that grief is not just another emotional outlook. Rather, grief is, as Freud said, "a grave departure from the normal attitude to life." When profound, grief can shake even one’s capacity to think of the lost loved one so that it would be a mistake to treat grief, essentially, as a form of thought of another—an orthodoxy in the recent philosophical literature on grief that prevents us from attending to grief in its full complexity. I argue that what can look like thought, even highly reflective thought, may in fact be better understood as a form of withdrawal (from the social world, into the self, etc.). What can appear, for example, to be a reflective or intellectually distanced stance on one’s own grief may be better understood as a detached one—a stance so removed from normal forms of engagement that one cannot enter into reflection in any recognizable sense. Taking C. S. Lewis's diary of grief as a guide, I argue that our capacity to think of the one who has died and to properly grieve them may, surprisingly enough, depend on one’s capacity to recognize their independence from oneself and to continue one’s relationship with them past death. In short, one must restore what has been lost so that there can, in fact, be loss.
Race and the Politics of Loss: Revisiting the Legacy of Emmett Till
This paper examines the idea that grief, familiar to us as an intensely particular and intimate form of experience, can take a properly political form. It considers the proposal, in particular, that political institutions should support our capacity to collectively grieve legacies of racial loss and violence and that the exercise of this capacity should be seen as an exercise of citizenship. I argue that Mamie Till Mobley was developing such a proposal in 1955, the year in which her son Emmett Till was lynched and in which she brought his body before all Americans calling on them to look at it so that they might, collectively, say what they had seen. As I discuss, the significance of this gesture has been obscured in a variety of ways. It was obscured in her day by those who thought, as we might today, that grief can only provide the catalyst for other, properly political ends. More recently, it has been obscured by the suggestion that grief is incompatible with culpability, precluding the possibility of collective grief. Finally, in the most recent defense of this kind of proposal, it has been obscured by the assumption that legacies of racial loss can be collectively mourned because these losses are themselves already collective—an assumption that Mobley did not make, I claim, in inviting all Americans to recognize the need to look upon the body of her son. In clarifying the significance of this gesture, my aim is to expand philosophical inquiry into the relationship between the emotions and political life and, more specifically, to contribute toward an evaluation of the prospects for a 'mournful politics.'
This paper examines the idea that grief, familiar to us as an intensely particular and intimate form of experience, can take a properly political form. It considers the proposal, in particular, that political institutions should support our capacity to collectively grieve legacies of racial loss and violence and that the exercise of this capacity should be seen as an exercise of citizenship. I argue that Mamie Till Mobley was developing such a proposal in 1955, the year in which her son Emmett Till was lynched and in which she brought his body before all Americans calling on them to look at it so that they might, collectively, say what they had seen. As I discuss, the significance of this gesture has been obscured in a variety of ways. It was obscured in her day by those who thought, as we might today, that grief can only provide the catalyst for other, properly political ends. More recently, it has been obscured by the suggestion that grief is incompatible with culpability, precluding the possibility of collective grief. Finally, in the most recent defense of this kind of proposal, it has been obscured by the assumption that legacies of racial loss can be collectively mourned because these losses are themselves already collective—an assumption that Mobley did not make, I claim, in inviting all Americans to recognize the need to look upon the body of her son. In clarifying the significance of this gesture, my aim is to expand philosophical inquiry into the relationship between the emotions and political life and, more specifically, to contribute toward an evaluation of the prospects for a 'mournful politics.'
On Empathy and Other Derangements
The 2017 exhibition of Dana Schutz's Open Casket prompted a wave of protest, with one artist describing it, simply, as a painting of a dead black boy by a white artist. Open Casket attempts to engage with the legacy of Emmett Till, a teenager lynched in 1955, and his mother, Mamie Till Mobley, who displayed his body over the course of a four-day open-casket viewing. This paper considers the reaction, specifically, to Schutz's claim to have painted Open Casket "through empathy" with Mamie Till Mobley. I defend the claim that critics have relied upon a sentimental conception of empathy in contesting Schutz's "claim to empathy" and offer an alternative conception, one better suited to understanding Schutz's remarks regarding her relation to this legacy. I further claim that this sentimental conception underwrites Jenefer Robinson's account of empathy and pictorial expression, limiting its application to works like Open Casket, which are expressive of a more modern sensibility.
The 2017 exhibition of Dana Schutz's Open Casket prompted a wave of protest, with one artist describing it, simply, as a painting of a dead black boy by a white artist. Open Casket attempts to engage with the legacy of Emmett Till, a teenager lynched in 1955, and his mother, Mamie Till Mobley, who displayed his body over the course of a four-day open-casket viewing. This paper considers the reaction, specifically, to Schutz's claim to have painted Open Casket "through empathy" with Mamie Till Mobley. I defend the claim that critics have relied upon a sentimental conception of empathy in contesting Schutz's "claim to empathy" and offer an alternative conception, one better suited to understanding Schutz's remarks regarding her relation to this legacy. I further claim that this sentimental conception underwrites Jenefer Robinson's account of empathy and pictorial expression, limiting its application to works like Open Casket, which are expressive of a more modern sensibility.
Black Lives Matter or All Lives Matter? Color-blindness and Epistemic Injustice
Those who take 'All lives matter' to oppose 'Black lives matter' take the latter to mean something like 'Only black lives matter.' Those who regard this exclusionary construal as mistaken hold the error to be due to an ideology of color-blindness. It has further been argued that the ideologically-motivated suppression of racial discourse has resulted in an epistemic injustice, blinding objectors to the fact that 'Black lives matter' really means 'Black lives matter, too.' I will argue that attempts to make sense of this interpretive response in terms of color-blindness are mistaken. As I will discuss, the interpretive debates surrounding the words ‘Black lives matter’ are reminiscent of those surrounding 'Black Power,' which unfolded long before color-blindness could be said to have been a prevailing ethos. Critical affirmations such as 'Black Power' and 'Black lives matter' have proved difficult for many interpreters to understand because of the way that they manifest resistance to white supremacy, eschewing both racial exclusion and racial inclusion (the latter fact being masked by inclusive reconstructions such as 'Black lives matter, too'). As I argue, however, the critical function of these statements calls into question the applicability of standard accounts of epistemic injustice.
Those who take 'All lives matter' to oppose 'Black lives matter' take the latter to mean something like 'Only black lives matter.' Those who regard this exclusionary construal as mistaken hold the error to be due to an ideology of color-blindness. It has further been argued that the ideologically-motivated suppression of racial discourse has resulted in an epistemic injustice, blinding objectors to the fact that 'Black lives matter' really means 'Black lives matter, too.' I will argue that attempts to make sense of this interpretive response in terms of color-blindness are mistaken. As I will discuss, the interpretive debates surrounding the words ‘Black lives matter’ are reminiscent of those surrounding 'Black Power,' which unfolded long before color-blindness could be said to have been a prevailing ethos. Critical affirmations such as 'Black Power' and 'Black lives matter' have proved difficult for many interpreters to understand because of the way that they manifest resistance to white supremacy, eschewing both racial exclusion and racial inclusion (the latter fact being masked by inclusive reconstructions such as 'Black lives matter, too'). As I argue, however, the critical function of these statements calls into question the applicability of standard accounts of epistemic injustice.
How to Cross the Atlantic Without Crossing It
This paper focuses on a decades-long debate concerning the modal status of the progressive and defends the thesis that the debate, though in a certain sense localized, actually gives us reason to abandon an approach to explanation within linguistics and philosophy that is currently in ascendancy; it presents us with a crack in the foundation. In particular, I argue that while some progressives give rise to substantive modal interpretations—namely, those that pattern with 'Mary is crossing the Atlantic,' which is associated with an arrival across—others do not—namely, those that pattern with 'Mary is swimming,' which isn’t associated with an outcome. Once these patterns are in view, the principal difficulty in accounting for them is immediately apparent: if we assume that progressive contributes a substantive modal condition, we fail to account for half of the pattern and if we assume that it doesn't, we fail to account for the other half. Since both parties to this debate assume that systematically available modal interpretations are to be explained in terms of modal meanings and their absence in terms of the absence of modal meanings, neither is in a position to account for these interpretations, explaining, in my view, the tendency to treat all progressives on the model of either 'crossing'- or 'swimming'-progressives. But though this approach to explanation is entrenched, it isn't the only one. This paper is an attempt to motivate an alternative and, specifically, to conceptualize the relationship between interpretation and form in a way that makes space for the possibility that these modal interpretations are not to be explained in terms of modal meanings.
This paper focuses on a decades-long debate concerning the modal status of the progressive and defends the thesis that the debate, though in a certain sense localized, actually gives us reason to abandon an approach to explanation within linguistics and philosophy that is currently in ascendancy; it presents us with a crack in the foundation. In particular, I argue that while some progressives give rise to substantive modal interpretations—namely, those that pattern with 'Mary is crossing the Atlantic,' which is associated with an arrival across—others do not—namely, those that pattern with 'Mary is swimming,' which isn’t associated with an outcome. Once these patterns are in view, the principal difficulty in accounting for them is immediately apparent: if we assume that progressive contributes a substantive modal condition, we fail to account for half of the pattern and if we assume that it doesn't, we fail to account for the other half. Since both parties to this debate assume that systematically available modal interpretations are to be explained in terms of modal meanings and their absence in terms of the absence of modal meanings, neither is in a position to account for these interpretations, explaining, in my view, the tendency to treat all progressives on the model of either 'crossing'- or 'swimming'-progressives. But though this approach to explanation is entrenched, it isn't the only one. This paper is an attempt to motivate an alternative and, specifically, to conceptualize the relationship between interpretation and form in a way that makes space for the possibility that these modal interpretations are not to be explained in terms of modal meanings.
Stative Puzzles: A Case Against Hidden Modality
This paper focuses on a set of modal puzzles that challenge deeply entrenched assumptions about how we come to interpret and understand natural languages. These puzzles arise in connection with sentences like 'Mary is in Paris for a week,' among others, which appear not to bear any obvious modal meanings (neither 'is in Paris' nor 'for a week' presents a strong case). These sorts of sentences are puzzling, in part, because they unexpectedly give rise to modal interpretations (e.g., it is understood that Mary stays in Paris until the end of the week across projected possible circumstances) which they then, equally unexpectedly, appear to lose ('Mary was in Paris for a week' says only that she actually spent a week there). Though the practice of explaining such modal interpretations in terms of modal meanings has become reflexive, I argue that these sorts of sentences cannot be assumed to have modal meanings; the assumption that they do is, in fact, what generates and sustains these apparent puzzles. Instead, these modal interpretations call for an "interface explanation"—one that appeals to an interaction between linguistic and extra-linguistic cognition—and, in particular, one that explains these modal interpretations in terms of an interaction between non-modal language and modal cognition. As I discuss, this conclusion ramifies across a constellation of modal interpretations that are thought to comprise a major natural language modal system (the "imperfective" system). If am right, this system is not a modal system at all, suggesting that linguistic meaning plays a much more circumscribed role in our ability to understand language than is currently assumed.
This paper focuses on a set of modal puzzles that challenge deeply entrenched assumptions about how we come to interpret and understand natural languages. These puzzles arise in connection with sentences like 'Mary is in Paris for a week,' among others, which appear not to bear any obvious modal meanings (neither 'is in Paris' nor 'for a week' presents a strong case). These sorts of sentences are puzzling, in part, because they unexpectedly give rise to modal interpretations (e.g., it is understood that Mary stays in Paris until the end of the week across projected possible circumstances) which they then, equally unexpectedly, appear to lose ('Mary was in Paris for a week' says only that she actually spent a week there). Though the practice of explaining such modal interpretations in terms of modal meanings has become reflexive, I argue that these sorts of sentences cannot be assumed to have modal meanings; the assumption that they do is, in fact, what generates and sustains these apparent puzzles. Instead, these modal interpretations call for an "interface explanation"—one that appeals to an interaction between linguistic and extra-linguistic cognition—and, in particular, one that explains these modal interpretations in terms of an interaction between non-modal language and modal cognition. As I discuss, this conclusion ramifies across a constellation of modal interpretations that are thought to comprise a major natural language modal system (the "imperfective" system). If am right, this system is not a modal system at all, suggesting that linguistic meaning plays a much more circumscribed role in our ability to understand language than is currently assumed.
