I'm an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Western Michigan University. I received my PhD in Philosophy from Princeton in 2014.
My current research falls into three main areas: the philosophy of language, the philosophy of mind, and social and political philosophy. My research in the philosophy of language focuses on aspects of linguistic interpretation that cannot be explained in terms of linguistic meaning, taking systems of telic and modal interpretation as core objects of study. I’m interested in understanding how these interpretations are generated (how, for example, can there be modal interpretations in the absence of modals?) and in what they reveal about our knowledge of language. My research in the philosophy of mind focuses on grief and empathy, two forms of experience that raise difficult questions about the boundary of self and other. In the case of grief, I’m interested in understanding, for example, the sense in which one needs the person who is lost in order to successfully grieve their loss (in understanding why one cannot do this alone). In the case of empathy, I’m interested in the relationship and tension between two familiar lines of thought, the first being that empathy requires my taking the stance that I could be you (in your position) and the second being that empathy requires that I put myself in your position. My research in social and political philosophy focuses on issues of race in America. My research aims to engage with and, more broadly, to bring the analytic tradition into contact with figures such as Mamie Till Mobley, Stokely Carmichael (Kwame Ture), and James Baldwin. My research aims, in particular, to make the case for rethinking the boundaries of the political sphere, epistemic justice, and group identity in the light of their work and example.
My current research falls into three main areas: the philosophy of language, the philosophy of mind, and social and political philosophy. My research in the philosophy of language focuses on aspects of linguistic interpretation that cannot be explained in terms of linguistic meaning, taking systems of telic and modal interpretation as core objects of study. I’m interested in understanding how these interpretations are generated (how, for example, can there be modal interpretations in the absence of modals?) and in what they reveal about our knowledge of language. My research in the philosophy of mind focuses on grief and empathy, two forms of experience that raise difficult questions about the boundary of self and other. In the case of grief, I’m interested in understanding, for example, the sense in which one needs the person who is lost in order to successfully grieve their loss (in understanding why one cannot do this alone). In the case of empathy, I’m interested in the relationship and tension between two familiar lines of thought, the first being that empathy requires my taking the stance that I could be you (in your position) and the second being that empathy requires that I put myself in your position. My research in social and political philosophy focuses on issues of race in America. My research aims to engage with and, more broadly, to bring the analytic tradition into contact with figures such as Mamie Till Mobley, Stokely Carmichael (Kwame Ture), and James Baldwin. My research aims, in particular, to make the case for rethinking the boundaries of the political sphere, epistemic justice, and group identity in the light of their work and example.
Papers
| Coming to Grief: Violence, Mourning, and Interracial Intimacy |
| The Empathy Defense: Emmett Till, "Open Casket," and 'White Empathy' |
| Black Lives Matter or All Lives Matter: Color-blindness and Epistemic Injustice |
| How to Cross the Atlantic Without Crossing It |
| On the Limits of Linguistic Meaning |
| Modality Without Modals |
| Stative Puzzles: A Case Against Hidden Modality |
| Actuality Entailments |
Papers-in-Progress
Back to the Futurate
I propose a novel analysis of simple futurates (e.g., 'The Yankees play the Red Sox tomorrow'). This analysis represents a synthesis of my proposals concerning the linguistic and cognitive profiles of progressive and futurate progressive expressions (in 'The Limits of Linguistic Meaning' and 'Modality Without Modals,' respectively) as well as my work on the puzzling modal behavior of a variety of other stative expressions (in 'Stative Puzzles: A Case Against Hidden Modality'). I also discuss how this analysis might open the way toward an interesting reconceptualization of what is now regarded as a major modal system in natural language: the imperfective system.
Making Progress
I review some ontological puzzles that concern the status of objects implicated in temporally extended, and in-progress events. I argue that my semantic analyses of the relevant sorts of event descriptions resolve these puzzles. I also consider leading alternatives to my account and show how these alternatives yield only piecemeal insights into these very puzzling but systematically connected phenomena.
Modality as a Window into Cognition
I summarize the case for my claim that a variety of natural language expressions give rise to modal interpretations though they do not have modal meanings. I also address questions concerning the intelligibility of the sort of explanation that I claim they require, among them, “Why should the interpretations to which they give rise be expected?” and “Where else might we find similar interpretations?” The answers to these questions reveal a great deal about the limitations of dominant frameworks for thinking about meaning and interpretation in both linguistics and philosophy as well as something about how they need to be revised.
I propose a novel analysis of simple futurates (e.g., 'The Yankees play the Red Sox tomorrow'). This analysis represents a synthesis of my proposals concerning the linguistic and cognitive profiles of progressive and futurate progressive expressions (in 'The Limits of Linguistic Meaning' and 'Modality Without Modals,' respectively) as well as my work on the puzzling modal behavior of a variety of other stative expressions (in 'Stative Puzzles: A Case Against Hidden Modality'). I also discuss how this analysis might open the way toward an interesting reconceptualization of what is now regarded as a major modal system in natural language: the imperfective system.
Making Progress
I review some ontological puzzles that concern the status of objects implicated in temporally extended, and in-progress events. I argue that my semantic analyses of the relevant sorts of event descriptions resolve these puzzles. I also consider leading alternatives to my account and show how these alternatives yield only piecemeal insights into these very puzzling but systematically connected phenomena.
Modality as a Window into Cognition
I summarize the case for my claim that a variety of natural language expressions give rise to modal interpretations though they do not have modal meanings. I also address questions concerning the intelligibility of the sort of explanation that I claim they require, among them, “Why should the interpretations to which they give rise be expected?” and “Where else might we find similar interpretations?” The answers to these questions reveal a great deal about the limitations of dominant frameworks for thinking about meaning and interpretation in both linguistics and philosophy as well as something about how they need to be revised.
